Pentagon officials ponder wider Afghan war
WASHINGTON -- Pentagon officials are quietly considering a significant change in the war command in Afghanistan to extend U.S. control of forces into the country's volatile south.
The idea is partly linked to an expectation of a fresh infusion of U.S. combat troops in the south next year.
Taliban resistance has stiffened in the south since NATO took command there in mid-2006, and some in the Bush administration believe the fight against the Taliban could be strengthened if the U.S., whose span of control is now limited to eastern Afghanistan, were also in charge of part or all the south.
The internal discussions about expanding the U.S. command role were described in recent interviews with several senior defense officials who have direct knowledge but were not authorized to talk about it publicly. All said they thought it unlikely a decision would be made anytime soon.
There are now about 34,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan -- the most at any time during the war, which began in October 2001.
At a NATO summit in early April, President Bush told the allies the U.S. would send many more troops to Afghanistan in 2009. He mentioned no numbers, but U.S. commanders say they need at least two more brigades, or 7,500 troops.
In early stages of the war, the U.S. military commanded forces across Afghanistan. NATO's security role initially was limited to heading an International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, in Kabul, the capital; but it spread, starting in 2004 -- first to the north, then west and, in 2006, to the south and the east.
The overall ISAF commander is an American general, Daniel McNeill, but the only sector headed by a U.S. general is the eastern area, where the 101st Airborne is in charge. If the southern sector were to be put under U.S. command, the American in charge there would still be subordinate to NATO.
Giving the U.S. more control in the south would address one problem cited by U.S. officials: the NATO allies' practice of rotating commanders every nine months -- and their fighting units every six months, in some cases. The 101st Airborne, by comparison, is in eastern Afghanistan on a 15-month deployment. In the U.S. view, nine-month commands are too short to maximize effectiveness.
U.S. combat tours in Afghanistan and Iraq are to shrink to 12 months starting in August.
The idea of changing the command structure has not yet developed into a proposal to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The internal discussions reflect concern at a lack of continuity among NATO forces and a view that, in the long run, NATO may be better off focusing mainly on areas of Afghanistan, like the north and west, where there is less fighting but a great need for noncombat aid.
Changing the command structure to give a U.S. general more control in the south would, in effect, mark a partial "re-Americanization" of the combat mission. That could be politically controversial, given U.S. interests in maintaining close ties with NATO in fighting terrorism.
NATO now has overall responsibility for the mission in Afghanistan, and that would not change if a U.S. general were to be put in charge in the southern sector. But it would give the Americans a greater degree of control.
Settling the command issue has implications not only for the success of the overall mission in Afghanistan but also for the NATO allies' willingness to join with the U.S. in future military ventures beyond Europe's borders.
The defense officials doubted a decision would be made before fall and possibly not until a new administration takes office in 2009. Two officials said there appears to be no high-level advocate for making such a change in the near term, although there is growing concern that while higher U.S. troop levels in Iraq have helped reduce violence there, the trends in Afghanistan are less positive.